Finding a person’s address based on their name and city relies on cross-referencing several sources of public data. The reliability of the result depends on the uniqueness of the name, the freshness of the databases consulted, and the legal framework governing access to this information.
Non-disclosable data in the Sirene database: a common blind spot
When the person being searched for is engaged in a professional activity (micro-enterprise, liberal profession, sole trader), the Sirene database from INSEE is often an overlooked avenue. This database lists establishments along with their registered addresses, which can be accessed for free on platforms like data.gouv.fr or business search engines.
The trap lies in the “non-disclosable” status. Since 2025, sole traders can request for free, via a procedure authenticated by FranceConnect, that their data be hidden from public distributions of Sirene. This option, based on article R.123-232-1 of the commercial code and article 21 of the GDPR, cuts off access to third-party sites that exploit this database.
In practice, if a search on a business directory returns no results for a name that is associated with a known activity, the person has likely activated this non-disclosure option. Several online guides allow you to find a person’s address using their name and city by combining the Sirene database with other sources, but this limitation still applies.
Online directories and name search: actual reliability of results
The White Pages remain the first reflex. The service indexes the contact details of telephone subscribers who have not requested to be on the unlisted list. By entering a name and a city, the engine filters the results geographically.
Two recurring problems limit this approach:
- Homonyms: a common name in a large city generates dozens of results without a reliable way to distinguish the right person, unless additional information is available (exact first name, neighborhood, age range).
- Outdated data: an unreported move to the telephone operator keeps the old address in the directory for months, sometimes years.
- Being on an unlisted or anti-solicitation list: the person simply disappears from public results, with no error message indicating this.
Other reverse directories (118 712 and its online variations) draw from the same operator databases. Changing directories does not truly diversify the source of data.
Social networks and search engines: cross-referencing information
Typing a name in quotes followed by the city name into a search engine sometimes produces usable results. Social media profiles, mentions in local associations, sports results published by federations, or minutes from municipal councils can reveal a location.
Facebook remains the network where users most often provide their city of residence. LinkedIn indicates the professional geographic area. None of these networks display a complete postal address, but they can confirm that a person indeed resides in the presumed city.
Advanced search on Google
The operator “first name last name” + “city” + site:facebook.com restricts results to a single network. This technique works better with less common names. For a frequent surname, adding an additional clue (employer, school, sports club) significantly refines the sorting.
Public profiles on social networks do not provide an address, but they open the possibility of direct contact via messaging, which is often more effective than searching for a postal address.
Legal framework and limits of address searching in France
Searching for a person’s address is not prohibited in itself. The legal limit lies in the use made of it and the means employed to obtain it.
The GDPR strictly regulates the collection and processing of personal data. A postal address constitutes a personal data in the sense of the regulation. Consulting it in a public directory is lawful. Storing, sharing, or using it for harassment purposes is not.
The “lookups”: tools to avoid
Specialized search engines, known as “lookups,” aggregate data from leaks and hacks to provide very detailed results (address, phone number, email, passwords). According to an investigation by Franceinfo, these platforms feed an ecosystem where hacked data is resold and accessed en masse, particularly by young users responding to a “herd effect.”
Using these services exposes users to several risks: possession of stolen data, violation of the GDPR, and questionable reliability (the information comes from often outdated and unverified databases). The CNIL can sanction both the service operator and the user who knowingly exploits illegally obtained data.
When self-searching reaches its limits
Certain situations make autonomous searching insufficient: legal procedures requiring a certified address, untraceable debtor, or a person who has voluntarily erased their digital traces. In these cases, a bailiff (now called a justice commissioner since the reform) can access administrative files that are not publicly accessible, such as the bank account file (Ficoba) or tax databases, as part of an enforceable title.
Licensed private detectives also have field investigation methods and professional databases, but their intervention comes at a cost and is only justified for documented stakes.
The combination of directories, the Sirene database, and social networks covers the majority of common cases. When these three sources yield nothing, it is generally because the person has taken active measures to protect their contact details, and this intention deserves to be respected.